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Abstract 
 
The memory conformity effect is when people’s memories become similar to one another’s 
following a discussion. The present study examined whether an individual’s beliefs in the 
quality of their memory, relative to another person’s, mediates susceptibility to memory 
conformity. Perceived encoding duration was manipulated by telling dyad members that one 
person had encoded a set of pictures for either half or twice as long as their partner. In fact, 
actual encoding duration was the same for all participants. Dyad members each encoded 
slightly different versions of otherwise identical pictures and discussed them prior to an 
individual free-recall test. Participants who believed that they had encoded the pictures for 
half as long as their partner were more susceptible to memory conformity, as indicated by 
their increased tendency to report errant items at test that had been encountered from their 
partner rather than items that they had actually seen. This effect of perceived encoding 
duration on memory conformity was mediated through response order. A source-monitoring 
test found that these unseen items were errantly attributed to the pictures approximately 50% 
of the time. The findings are discussed in relation to the role of metamemory in susceptibility 
to memory conformity.  
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I saw it for longer than you: The relationship between perceived encoding duration and 
memory conformity 
 
Introduction 
Human memory is fallible and susceptible to influence. For example, within the eyewitness 
literature it is often found that exposure to post-event information (PEI) can affect a person’s 
ability to report details of an originally encoded event (see Ayers & Reder, 1998; Ceci & 
Bruck, 1993; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Payne, Toglia, & Anastasi, 1994). This 
phenomenon is commonly referred to as the misinformation effect. In everyday life PEI can 
be encountered when individuals who have shared the same experience discuss this with one 
another.  Even when each person has witnessed the same event, their memories are likely to 
differ because of naturally occurring differences in the details attended to at the time, as well 
as actual or perceived differences in each person’s ability to accurately recall those details. 
Recent research has shown that despite initial differences in recollections of an event, when 
two people talk about their memories they can influence one another such that their 
subsequent memory reports become similar (Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; 
Granhag, Memon, Gabbert, & Allwood, 2004; Mori, 2003; Paterson & Kemp, 2003; Wright, 
Mathews, & Skagerberg, 2005). This has been described as memory conformity (Gabbert, 
Memon, & Allan, 2003; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000) and social contagion of memory 
(Meade & Roediger, 2002; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001).  
In a typical memory conformity study two people are led to believe they have viewed 
an identical set of stimuli, when in reality they are shown stimuli that differ. They then 
discuss what they have seen prior to completing an independent memory report.  For example, 
in Wright et al. (2000, Exp. 2), each member of a dyad saw one of two sets of 21 slides 
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depicting a criminal event. The critical difference between the sets was whether there was an 
accomplice. After the dyads discussed the event, aspects of one member’s verbal report was 
often found to influence what their partner later reported when tested individually. The typical 
finding was conformity to the most confident dyad member (Wright et al., 2000). More 
recently, Gabbert et al. (2003) showed dyad members the same event but filmed from 
different angles to simulate different witness perspectives. Critically, some features of the 
event were visible to one member of the dyad but not to the other. These contrasting details 
often arose in the discussions and people’s memories were transformed by what the other 
person had said. Seventy-one percent of participants reported errant details acquired during 
the discussion. Furthermore, 60% of participants reported that a theft had occurred even 
though a crime was not visible in the version of the event that they had seen.  
The memory conformity paradigm described above enables researchers to investigate 
the effects of discussion on subsequent recall accuracy in ecologically valid settings. Memory 
conformity following a discussion is a well-established finding in this paradigm. The aim of 
the current study is to improve our understanding of how memory conformity might occur. 
Our recent research has investigated this issue by analysing the dialogue between dyad 
members when they discussed encoded stimuli to reveal where and when any influence 
occurs.  (Gabbert, Memon & Wright, in press). Our most striking finding was a large 
association: the witness initiating the discussion was most likely to influence the other 
witness’s memory report. Thus the witness hearing the misinformation conformed to their co-
witness. This was particularly evident when witnesses chose not to challenge their co-witness, 
but was also observed when a dispute had arisen over what had been witnessed. Furthermore, 
the witness initiating the discussion was also the most resistant to influence even when their 
memory was disputed by their co-witness.  
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This novel and intriguing finding is explored further in the present research. We 
believe it is likely that the association between response order and conformity is spurious, 
with each being influenced by other variables. Following Wright et al’s (2000) findings, an 
obvious candidate is confidence in one’s memory. For example, if one group member feels 
that the quality of their memory is superior to that of another person’s, then it is feasible that 
they are the first to report their memories in a discussion, and the least likely to be influenced 
when hearing other people’s memory reports. Thus, the current research examines the role of 
confidence in one’s memory as a potential mediating factor underlying the memory 
conformity effect. We manipulate perceived memory quality to examine whether an 
individual’s belief in the strength of his or her memory for encoded stimuli, relative to another 
person’s, affects response order within a joint recall discussion and susceptibility to memory 
conformity in a subsequent individual recall test. Actual memory ability is not the primary 
focus because past research has shown that susceptibility to memory conformity does not 
always bear a simple relationship to memory for the encoded stimuli. For example, Gabbert et 
al. (2003) found that participants with poor memory for an event were no more susceptible to 
memory conformity than were those with good event memory (see also Gabbert et al. 2004; 
Mori, 2003). It is hypothesised that an individual’s beliefs about their memory ability may 
affect the extent to which individuals rely on their own recollections in a recall test.  
Theoretical support for the hypothesis that there may be an association between belief 
in one’s memory and susceptibility to memory conformity comes from literature on 
metamemory. Metamemory refers to people’s knowledge and beliefs about their memory, and 
how these are used to regulate what is reported (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000; 2003). 
For example, research has shown that some metacognitive judgements involve a conscious 
deliberation of available information to form an educated guess about one’s knowledge (see 
Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; 2000). In relation to the current 
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research, if a person lacks confidence in their own memory as a result of our experimental 
manipulation, they might be less likely to report their recollections in a joint recall discussion. 
In addition, they might be more likely to place trust in the validity of their partner’s 
recollections when reporting information in the individual recall test. Supporting this, 
research has found that perceptions of source credibility can mediate susceptibility to 
influence, such that a larger misinformation effect is often found when the source of the PEI 
is perceived as highly competent (e.g., Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005; Hoffman, Granhag, 
Kwong See, & Loftus, 2001; Kwong See, Hoffman, & Wood, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1987). 
In addition to examining how metacognitive judgements, based on one’s beliefs about 
the quality of their memory for encoded stimuli, can influence response order and memory 
conformity, the current paper also examines the extent to which participants can accurately 
determine the source of information reported at test. Post-event details might be errantly 
reported at test because of a source confusion, which can occur when a memory from one 
source (e.g., a discussion with another person) is misattributed to a different source (e.g., the 
witnessed event) (see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Alternatively, post-event 
details might be reported if they are believed to be valid, regardless of whether they can 
actually be remembered as part of the originally encoded stimuli or not. The decision to report 
these details might be based on a metacognitive judgement regarding beliefs about which 
person’s memory is most likely to be accurate.  
In sum, in a study using the memory conformity paradigm, dyad members will receive 
false feedback that one has encoded a set of stimuli for twice the time (vs. half the time) to 
that of their partner. A relationship between perceived memory quality and susceptibility to 
memory conformity is hypothesised, where participants who believe they have encoded 
stimuli for less time will be more susceptible to memory conformity. We will examine to 
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what extent this is mediated by response order in the joint recall discussions. Based on prior 
research evidence (Gabbert et al., 2003),  no relationship between actual memory performance 
and susceptibility to memory conformity is expected. Furthermore, no differences in memory 
accuracy for neutral items is expected (i.e., where no PEI is encountered), as despite the 
feedback received the participants will have actually viewed the stimuli for the same length of 
time and thus should be able to report a similar number of neutral details at test.  
 
Method 
Participants. Ninety-two first year psychology students were tested in return for course-
credit. Two pairs were excluded from analysis because their discussions were too quiet to be 
transcribed. Thus, data from 88 participants were included (18-28 years; M = 19.73; SD = 
2.37). 
  
Materials 
Pictures. Four pictures of complex scenes containing a number of details regarding objects, 
descriptions, etc, were used as stimuli to encode (adapted from Forbes & Venneri, 2002). Two 
versions of each picture (A and B) were created that were the same except for two 
contradicting details, which we refer to as critical items (for an example see Appendix A, for 
full details of all critical items see Table 1). Each member of a dyad saw a different version of 
each of the four pictures. Thus, over four pictures dyad members encountered eight critical 
items that contradicted a detail their partner had seen. Pilot data (n = 19) showed that the 
contradicting details of the different versions were remembered approximately as well as each 
other. The versions of pictures seen were counterbalanced across experimental conditions.  
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Table 1 about here 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in previously unacquainted dyads. On arrival dyad members were 
seated at computer desks with their backs to one another. The following instructions were 
given: 
“You have volunteered to take part in a picture memory study. Over the course 
of this experiment, you and a partner will be given four pictures to study, which you will 
be asked to recall both jointly and individually. Each time you are shown a picture one 
of you will be able to study it for either twice or half as long as your partner. The 
computer will randomly assign the amount of time you see a picture for. There will be 
memory tests for the studied pictures.” 
Although each participant was told that they had seen the pictures for twice (or half) as long 
as their partner, they actually saw the pictures for the same amount of time (30 seconds each). 
Participants remained in the same condition throughout, i.e., either always believing that they 
had seen the pictures for twice or half the time as their partner. 
To start, participants worked through a short paper and pencil filler task at their own 
pace. The filler task was in place to defend against dyad members viewing the pictures at 
exactly the same moment, which might have raised the potential for them to guess the 
experimental manipulation. On completion they were directed to the computer for the next 
phase of the experiment. Instructions on the computer screen informed participants that a 
picture would appear for them to study once they pressed a key indicating that they are ready 
to begin. The picture remained on the screen for 30 seconds. This was followed by a message 
that either said “You have seen this for twice as long as your partner” or “You have seen this 
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for half as long as your partner”. Participants were asked to keep a record of this information 
for the experimenter to make sure that they had paid attention to the manipulation. Before 
continuing with the next stage of the experiment, participants completed a visual puzzle 
where they had to find a path from A to B through a maze. 
Next, dyad members were asked to jointly recall the picture they had just studied. This 
discussion was audio-taped. Participants were given no further instructions than simply to 
discuss the picture in as much detail as possible until no further details could be recalled. No 
time limit was imposed. Following this collaborative recall discussion, participants then 
individually completed a free recall test. Instructions guided them to think back to the picture 
they had just viewed, rather than just to the discussion about the picture, and to report the 
details that they could remember seeing. No time limits were imposed for the joint or 
individual recall tasks. On completion, participants worked through another paper and pencil 
filler task individually for approximately five minutes. Picture 2 was then studied for 30 
seconds in the same way as before, with each dyad member seeing either version A or B, and 
believing that they had viewed the picture for either twice or half as long as their partner. 
Another maze filler task was then completed before the co-witness discussion phase for 
Picture 2. The same procedure was followed for the individual free recall. This procedure was 
repeated until all four pictures had been shown.  
At the end of the experiment, a source-monitoring task was administered.  Participants 
were asked to review their four free recall responses and to circle the details that they 
remembered hearing from their co-witness, but not actually seeing themselves. Participants 
were asked to leave unmarked the details that they did remember seeing in the pictures. They 
were also asked to underline the details for which they could not remember the source. 
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A post-test manipulation check asked dyad members if they had been aware that they 
had seen different pictures. None of the participants expressed suspicion about the 
experimental manipulation. 
 
Coding 
The four discussions for each dyad were audio-taped, transcribed, and coded in relation to 
which member of the dyad had been the first to mention a critical item. Coders were blind as 
to which experimental condition participants had been assigned to. The free recall responses 
were coded in relation to the number of accurate and errant neutral details from the pictures, 
and the number of accurate and errant critical items. A critical item was deemed accurate if 
the participant had reported a critical item that they had seen. In contrast, a critical item was 
coded as errant if the participant had reported a critical item that their partner had seen. Data 
from the four discussions and four individual free recall tests were pooled for the analyses.  
 
Results 
The primary aim of the current research was to explore the effects of perceived encoding 
duration on participants’ performance in the co-witness discussions as well as their 
susceptibility to memory conformity in the individual recall tests. In addition we explored the 
accuracy of source judgements regarding accurate and errant critical items reported at test by 
participants in the two experimental conditions. 
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Preliminary analyses: Memory accuracy for neutral items  
The individual free recall responses were coded in relation to the number of correct and 
incorrect items of neutral information recalled about the pictures. This analysis did not 
include any of the ‘critical’ co-witness items. There was no difference in memory accuracy 
between participants who had viewed either Versions ‘A’ or ‘B’ of the pictures, for either the 
number of correct, or incorrect, items of information reported (highest F (1, 86) = 2.40, ns). 
Furthermore, as hypothesised, no difference in the number of correct, or incorrect, neutral 
items of information reported was found between conditions (F’s (1, 86) < 1). See Table 2 for 
means. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Further analysis investigated whether there was any relationship between the number 
of accurate items of information reported at test and the number of errant co-witness details 
reported at test. There was a non-significant correlation (r = .04), suggesting that 
susceptibility to co-witness influence was not related to memory for the pictures (as measured 
by the number of accurate event details recalled). Participants who had not been influenced by 
their co-witness reported an average of 66.07 (SD = 19.55) accurate items of information at 
test, and participants who were influenced (i.e., reported at least one unseen detail at test) 
recalled an average of 61.53 (SD = 18.10) accurate items of information at test (F (1, 86) = 
1.14, ns). 
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Analysis of co-witness discussions 
The number of contradicting critical items discussed varied from 1 to 7 (mean = 4.08), with 
359 critical items discussed in total, across the four pictures.  Participants who believed they 
had seen the pictures for twice as long as their partner mentioned significantly more critical 
items in the co-witness discussions (means = 4.52 and 3.64 for ‘twice the time’ and ‘half the 
time’ respectively, F (1, 86) = 9.46, p < .01; MSE = 17.28; η² = .10). They were also more 
likely to mention the critical items first in the discussions, before their partner had mentioned 
the corresponding critical item that they had seen (means = 3.75 and 2.43 for ‘twice the time’ 
and ‘half the time’ respectively (F (1, 86) = 20.67, p < .01; MSE = 38.23; η² = .19).  
 
Analysis of individual free-recall 
Of the 359 critical items mentioned in the co-witness discussions, 28% (102 out of 359) were 
later errantly reported in the final free recall test, despite an instruction to report only what 
was seen. Thus, a memory conformity effect was observed. The following analyses focus only 
on the critical items that were discussed. A mixed design ANOVA revealed an interaction 
between condition and accuracy (F (1, 86) = 7.61, p < .01; MSE = 12.02; η² = .08), where 
more errant critical items were reported on average by participants who believed they had 
seen the pictures for half as long as their partner, and more correct critical items were reported 
by participants who believed they had seen the pictures for twice as long as their partner (see 
Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 about here 
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To investigate whether the likelihood of being influenced could be predicted, a logistic 
regression analysis was performed with ‘influenced’ (yes/no) as the outcome variable and two 
predictors: ‘perceived encoding duration’ (half the time/twice the time) and ‘mentioned 
critical item first?’ (yes/no). Results indicated that participants were more likely to be 
influenced if they were not the person who initially mentioned the critical item (χ2  (1) = 
105.98, p < .01). The odds ratio showed that influence was 12 times more likely to occur in 
cases where the individual had not been the first to mention the critical item that they had 
seen (lower and upper confidence intervals = 7.23 and 21.38 respectively). Perceived 
encoding duration had a non-significant effect in relation to predicting influence (χ2  (1) = 
1.74, ns).  Furthermore, the interaction between mentioning a critical item first and perceived 
encoding duration had a non-significant effect on the model (χ2  (1) = 2.51, ns). Thus, after 
controlling for who mentions a critical item first, the experimental manipulation did not 
produce a significant effect. This suggests that the effect of perceived encoding duration on 
memory conformity is mediated through response order. 
  
Source judgements 
Participants were asked to identify the source of the information they had provided in their 
free recall reports about the pictures they had seen. Table 3 presents a summary of the source 
judgements given for the incorrect (co-witness) critical items reported. There was no 
association between experimental condition (half the time vs. twice the time) and the accuracy 
of source judgements (‘Saw it in picture’ vs. ‘Co-witness told me’) for participants who had 
errantly reported a critical item (χ2 (1) < 1).   
 
Table 3 about here 
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Discussion 
The current study manipulated perceived encoding duration within dyads to examine the 
effect that this has on susceptibility to memory conformity. Actual encoding duration was 
held constant across all participants. Our main finding was that participants who believed they 
had encoded the pictures for ‘half the time’ as their partner were more susceptible to memory 
conformity, reporting significantly more errant critical items at test, and were significantly 
less accurate in reporting the critical items that they had seen themselves. As hypothesised, 
actual memory quality for the encoded stimuli was not associated with susceptibility to 
memory conformity. There was no difference in the accuracy of the source judgements 
regarding errant critical items reported at test for participants in the two experimental 
conditions. Also in line with predictions, the mean number of accurate neutral items recalled 
about the stimuli was approximately the same for participants who believed they had seen the 
pictures for more versus less time than had their partner. This suggests that actual memory 
ability was equivalent across conditions. Furthermore, it draws attention to the fact that the 
effects of the experimental manipulation were manifest only when the discrepant critical 
items were encountered in the co-witness discussions, and did not have an effect on the 
reporting of neutral items.  
Our findings have important applied implications. For example, they suggest that 
eyewitnesses who believe that they have an inferior memory quality to others are more likely 
to become influenced by, and subsequently report, items of errant PEI encountered from 
another person. Furthermore, our source monitoring data suggest that errant details reported at 
test are often attributed to the wrong source, such that they are believed to have been seen as 
opposed to originating from the post-event co-witness discussion. Thus, the police may view 
consistent statements from witnesses as valuable corroborative evidence, when in fact our 
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research highlights the possibility that such evidence is potentially contaminated as a result of 
memory conformity (see Granhag, Ask, & Rebelius, 2005).   
Why does perceived encoding quality influence susceptibility to memory conformity? 
The data show that the perceived encoding manipulation affected the number of critical items 
mentioned in the joint recall discussions. Participants who believed that they had encoded 
pictures for twice as long as their partner recalled significantly more critical items, and were 
more likely to report them first, i.e., before their partner mentioned the critical item that they 
had seen. The data suggest that the effect of mentioning a critical item first is accounting for 
the difference in memory conformity found between participants in each experimental 
condition. Experimental condition alone did not predict susceptibility to influence. 
Participants who believed that they had encoded the stimuli for half as long as their partner 
were more susceptible to memory conformity because they had encountered more misleading 
critical items from their partner in the discussions. This finding is interesting because it 
implies that the feedback manipulation influenced the social dynamics within the joint recall 
discussions. Dyad members who saw themselves as relatively more knowledgeable about the 
stimuli or as having a better memory quality appeared to dominate the discussions by 
reporting more critical items than their partner, and often before their partner had reported 
their own recollections. Thus meta-memorial beliefs determined how much misleading 
information one witness communicated to another witness by influencing response order in 
the discussions.  
Our previous research has also found a relationship between the order in which critical 
items are reported in a joint recall discussion and subsequent memory conformity (Gabbert et 
al., in press). Specifically, individuals who encounter information before reporting their own 
recollections are more susceptible to memory conformity. Reysen (2005) draws upon the 
‘social loafing’ hypothesis (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979, see also, Chapman, Arenson, 
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Carrigan, & Gryckiewicz, 1993) from the social influence literature to offer a plausible 
explanation for this. Research on social loafing has found that when one individual is actively 
contributing to a group activity (such as joint recall) then other members of the group will 
often exert less cognitive effort themselves. Thus, it is possible that participants do not work 
as hard to recollect the stimuli themselves when listening to their partner recall his/her own 
memories, and subsequently conform to what their partner has said, regardless of whether or 
not it is accurate. 
Alternatively, hearing another person report their memories before recollecting one’s 
own might have a deleterious effect on an individual’s subsequent ability to report their 
memories optimally. Such an effect has previously been demonstrated in tests of joint 
retrieval of word lists (see, Basden, Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997; Meudell, Hitch, & 
Boyle, 1995; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997; Wright & Klumpp, 2004). For example, many 
researchers have found that collaborative retrieval can inhibit recall performance. This is 
currently thought to be caused by a disruption to normal memory processes, where 
encountering another person’s recall output prior to recalling an item oneself can interfere 
with one’s naturally ordered retrieval strategy, which can cause some items to be forgotten 
(see Basden et al. 1997; Wright & Klumpp, 2004). In relation to the current study, it is 
possible that this might lead to a larger reliance on their partner’s recollections. Such an effect 
has so far only been demonstrated with relatively artificial stimuli, however, this does not rule 
out the fact that collaborative inhibition is also possible in a joint recall discussion. 
It was suggested in the introduction that a conscious metacognitive judgement might 
be responsible for increased memory conformity among participants who believed their 
encoding quality for the stimuli was inferior to that of their partner. However, the source 
monitoring data do not support this, as there were no differences in source monitoring 
accuracy between the two conditions. Across the conditions, the source monitoring data 
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showed that critical items that had been encountered as PEI in the discussions, rather than 
actually seen, were only attributed to the correct source approximately 50% of the time. Thus, 
it appears that encountering PEI in a discussion can result in source misattribution error. 
Errors are focused upon here (rather than accurate source attributions) because of the obvious 
applied implications in a forensic setting. Based upon Zaragoza and Lane’s (1994) research, 
there is reason to believe that encountering PEI in a joint-recall discussion might be 
particularly conducive to encouraging subsequent source-confusions. Zaragoza and Lane 
(1994) found that participants were significantly more likely to make source monitoring errors 
when they were required to actively retrieve (i.e., ‘reactivate’) the originally encoded 
information while processing the misleading PEI, than when the originally encoded 
information was not reactivated. This finding is particularly pertinent to the present research. 
Discussing the details of an event with a co-witness is a powerful form of encountering PEI 
because it occurs when the originally encoded memory is actively being retrieved.  
In sum, participants who believed that they had encoded pictures for half as long as 
their partner were more susceptible to memory conformity despite there being no differences 
in the pattern of source-monitoring accuracy across the two experimental conditions. This 
effect of perceived encoding duration on memory conformity was mediated through response 
order. Thus, the memory conformity effect has once again been found, this time with a little 
more understanding of the underlying mechanisms.  
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Table 1. Outline of the critical differences between the two versions of each picture 
Picture Version A Version B 
1, Kitchen  a) 2 cups and a plate near 
the sink 
b) Tree visible through 
kitchen window 
a) 2 cups and a teapot near 
the sink 
b) House visible through 
kitchen window 
2, Town 
Centre  
a) Man up ladder painting 
window frame 
b) Man walking his dog 
a) Man up ladder washing 
window 
b) Woman walking her dog 
3, Living 
Room  
a) Rug visible in bottom 
left of picture 
b) Woman holding a 
cigarette  
a) Coffee table visible in 
bottom left of picture 
b) Woman holding a glass 
of red wine  
4, Crossroad  a) Grocers shop on street 
corner 
b) Yellow car with baby 
in the back 
a) Florists on street corner 
b) Green car with baby in 
the back 
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Table 2. Number of accurate and errant neutral items recalled from the pictures (SD in 
parentheses) 
 Perceived encoding duration 
 Half the time Twice the time 
Accurate neutral items 60.86 (19.55) 65.09 (17.53) 
Errant neutral items 4.55 (4.62) 4.25 (2.87) 
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Table 3: Proportion of source judgements given to the incorrect (co-witness) critical items 
reported at test (Raw data in parentheses) 
 
 
  Source judgement 
  Errant:    
‘Saw it in 
picture 
Accurate: 
‘Co-witness 
told me’ 
‘Can’t 
remember’ 
 
Half the 
time 
Influenced 
(Errant critical 
item reported) 
 
.56 (35)  
 
.39 (24)  
 
.05 (3)  
 
Twice the 
time 
Influenced 
(Errant critical 
item reported) 
 
.48 (19)  
 
.48 (19)  
 
.04 (2)  
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Figure 1. Mean number of accurate and errant critical items reported in each condition 
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Appendix A. 
Example of stimuli (original format is full colour). The two critical items in these pictures are 
the type of shop seen in the corner on the picture (grocers shop or florist shop), and the colour 
of the car seen at the bottom of the picture. Full colour stimuli can be viewed and downloaded 
at http://portal.abertay.ac.uk/pls/portal/URL/PAGE/shared/f/f513576.     
 
Crossroad Scene: Version A 
 
Crossroad Scene: Version B 
